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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the importance of core competencies and skills-
based competition among general contractors in the Boston Public Works
Construction Market. Core competencies are defined here as a skill or
skills-set which provides access to a wide variety of markets, makes a
significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end
product, and is difficult for competitors to imitate. Skills-based
competition is defined as a competition where the contractors who possess
skills which most closely match the requirements of a given project will
hold an advantage in that competition.
The motivation for this investigation was twofold: first, as a highly
fragmented industry with low technical content, public works contractors
are believed to have little competitive advantage vis-a-vis their competitors.
Secondly, industry authors and working members both speculate that
contracts awarded by competitive bid, as in public works construction, do
not typically yield the most qualified contractor as low bidder.
The research was based on survey results from, and personal interviews
with, thirty Boston-area industry members, including general
contractors, subcontractors, public authority representatives, and design
engineers. The results indicated that the firms studied did not typically
possess core competencies in the eight construction and management
categories studied. Furthermore, no significant correlation was observed
between the proximity of a firm's bid to the low bid and how closely a
firm's skills set matched the most difficult aspects of a project: firms
which were considered highly skilled did not approach the low bid any
more than the lower ranked firms. The differences between construction
and management skills are analyzed, and other factors which may
influence project bidding are also explored.
Thesis Supervisors: Fred Moavenzadeh, Professor of Civil Engineering
William F. Pounds, Professor of Management
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
The competition in public works construction is very different from the competition in
most other industries. The General Contractors who compete to sell their product,
construction services, must provide a product which exactly matches the requirements
which the purchaser has specified. The contractors successfully sell only a small
number of products (projects) each year, and can typically expect several other firms in
competition on any given sale. Among the firms who are prequalified (by the
purchaser's standards) to bid on the contracts, the only criterion used to select the winner
is the price at which the services are offered. The purchasers of the products are all
government agencies, and their propensity to support a proposed project is often
influenced by political pressures and the availability of funds. It is in this context that
public works general contractors compete.
General contractors actually compete against each other infrequently, and that
competition is largely defined by the bidding process. The bidding process determines
the volume of work which a firm will perform, and the likely profit margins which the
firms will reap. The bidding process is thus of vital importance to the general
contractors (all future references to general contractors will mean those which perform
public works projects).
Background
In "The Core Competence of a Corporation," (Harvard Business Review, May
1990) Prahalad and Hamel argue that a corporation is successful when it develops core
competencies which can be applied to a variety of products and industries. They define a
core competency as a skill or skills set which:
1. provides potential access to a wide variety of markets;
2. makes a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the
end product; and
3. is difficult for competitors to imitate.
Prahalad and Hamel cite examples such as Sony's ability to miniaturize
electronics components (hand-held radios and TV's, camcorders) and Honda's ability to
perfect engines and drivetrains (automobiles, motorcycles, generators). In both cases the
firms used their core competencies to achieve superiority in current markets and make
strategic advances in others. The authors argue that core competencies are typically
developed using resources from across the company (and through strategic alliances),
and are used to positively impact a wide range of business units and products.
King and de Neufville (1990) employ an Economic Utility analysis to measure
the effect which a contractor's need for work and perceived risk of the project impact the
contractor's bidding. They found significant evidence that a contractor's need for work
results in lower bids, and that perceived risk of the project results in higher bids.
Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the importance of core competencies in
the competition among general contractors. A specific public works construction market
will first be examined for examples of firms which exhibit core competencies. This
market will also be analyzed to determine to what extent the competition among the
contractors in the market is influenced by the skill levels of the firms within the market.
The differences between management and construction skills among the contractors,
and on the projects they build, will be estimated. Other factors will be explored which
influence the bidding for contracts, and thus influence the competition among the firms.
The thesis will conclude with the implications that these findings will have on a large
upcoming project in Boston.
Chapter 2: RESEARCH METHOD
As discussed in the introduction, this research project attempts to investigate two
related topics:
1. The notion of Core Competencies among general contractors will be
investigaged. Do any of the studied firms display Core Competencies, as defined by
Prahalad and Hamel? Are these core competencies manifested in their tendencies and
successes in bidding for contracts?
2. More generally, the prevalence of skills-based competition among
contractors will also be investigated. Specifically, to what extent is a General
Contractor's success in winning publicly bid construction contracts determined by the
contractor's skill levels vis-a-vis its competitors, and how those skills match the
requirements of the project being bid? This project will attempt to determine whether or
not contractor's skills vary significantly among several typical elements of a project,
and whether a contractor's comparative advantage in some or all of these elements is
reflected in their success in bidding on contracts.
Target Study
The "Boston Public Works Construction Market" was chosen as the target study
for this project. Twenty-three recent projects were chosen from this market to serve as the
basis of study. The projects ranged in value from $3.5MM to $188MM, with an average
value of $28MM. Six of the projects were valued at less than $6MM, while three projects
were valued higher than $60MM. The selected projects all met the following criteria:
*The projects involved heavy construction work;
*The contracts were awarded by open, competitive bids;
*The projects involved a wide variety of construction work and management
activity;
*The contracts were bid on by several contractors, with considerable overlap
among the bidding contractors from project to project.
The twenty-three projects involved seven different types of projects:
*Highway Bridges (1) *Sewage Pump Stations (4)
*Earthmoving (1) *Water Treatment Plants (1)
*Sewer Pipelines (5) *Waste Water Treatment Plants (10)
*Water Resevoir (1)
From this list of projects, the twelve contractors who frequently bid on them were
targeted for further study. Of the twelve contractors, nine of them performed the bulk of
their work in the greater Boston area, while the remaining three performed work in
several areas of the U.S. The three national contractors reported 1990 annual revenues of
between $500MM and $1,200MM, while the local contractors' revenues were in the range
$20MM to $150MM.
As evidenced by the bidding on the projects, the chosen sample involves a group of
contractors with high competitive interaction, where no single contractor appears
dominant. The twelve chosen contractors bid on an average of 9.33 of the targeted
projects; the contractors won beween zero and four of the targeted projects, and each
project was bid on by an average of five of the targeted contractors.
Skills-based Competition
The method of study for analyzing the skills-based competition among the
contractors is as follows:
For the targeted projects of study, eight "work types" which were significant parts
of most of the projects were identified. These work types involve both actual construction
work and management work. The eight work types are:
1.Excavation for Structures 2.Pipelines
3.Tunnelling 4.Mass Concrete
5.Thin Concrete 6.Site/Subcontractor Management
7.Procurement/Shop Drawing Management
8.Mechanical Equipment Installation.
Sixty-six surveys were distributed among various members of the industry. The
first part of the survey (Exhibit 6) asked the respondents to rate the skill of each of the
target contractors (with whom they were familiar) on their performance in each of the
work types listed above. In the case where the General Contractor typically subcontracted
out the given work type, the respondent was asked to rate the General Contractor's skill in
choosing and managing the subcontractor. The second survey (Exhibit 6) asked the
respondents to rate the level of difficulty of each of target projects (with which they were
familiar) in each of these same work types.
In an effort to establish a uniform basis for ranking, the surveys defined "most
skillful" as a progression of work which would "experience a minimum amount of
rework and waste, achieve the fastest schedule, and result in the highest worker
productivity". Similarly, "most difficult" was defined as a work type in which most
contractors would experience "high rework, schedule delays, and/or low productivity".
The respondents were asked to use the following scales in rating the Contractor
Skills and Project Difficulty:
Contractor Skills Project Difficulty
4=Most Skillful 4=Most Difficult
3=Better than Average 3=Very Difficult
2=Average 2=Average Difficulty
1=Below Average 1=Easier than Most
Targeted respondents were:
*Employees of firms that work as subcontractors (two rebar/steel erectors, one
mechanical equipment installer) to the General Contractors, and have worked on some
of the projects. Nine surveys were distributed to this group.
*Employees of engineering firms that have performed construction
management or inspection services with these contractors on the targeted projects and/or
on other projects (four firms targeted). Twenty surveys were distributed to this group.
*Employees of the two state agencies that owned the projects, and who had
management or inspection responsibility on the projects. Ten surveys were distributed to
this group.
*Employees of the twelve targeted contractors. Twenty-seven surveys were
distributed to this group.
Of the 66 surveys sent out, 35 were returned. Many of the surveys were not signed,
and thus it is not possible to determine the breakdown of respondents by group.
The actual bidding results of the 23 projects were obtained from the project
owners. In each project the low bidder and price was identified, as well as the per cent
margin from the low bidder of each of the other contactors' bids.
For each project, a Predicted Outcome of each firm which bid on the project was
calculated as follows:
Predicted Outcome = Contractor Relative Skill( i) * Weighting Factor( i),
where i is the index of work types,
Contractor Relative Skill (i) = Contractor's Skill (i) , and
Ave. of All Bidders' Skill (i)
Weighting Factor (i) = Difficulty of Work Tve (i)
Average Difficulty Work Type(i)
over all projects
The rationale for this method of analysis is as follows: Contractor's Relative
Skill measures how skillful a firm is perceived to be in the eight categories vis-a-vis the
other bidders--a contractor who outperforms its competitors in one or more work types
should have an advantage in the bidding on that project.
The Weighting Factor measures the difficulty of each work type within the project
vis-a-vis the market norms. Thus the Weighting Factors are the rewards (or penalties)
which a given contractor should experience in the project bidding for the skills (or lack
thereof) it possesses in the various work types. A contractor which outperforms its
competitors in a set of work types should experience more success in bidding for projects
which demand skill in those work types (as measured by difficulty) than in those projects
which do not demand skill.
Thus the Predicted Outcome of a firm in bidding a project is calculated such that:
*the Predicted Outcome is higher, the higher the firm's skill vis-a-vis its
competitors;
*the Predicted outcome is higher the more closely a firm's high-skill work
types match the project's high-difficulty work types.
The Predicted Outcomes of all bidding contractors in all projects are then
calculated. The extent to which the Predicted Outcomes are true predictors of a firm's
success is measured as follows: for each project, correlations will be run between the
bidding firms' Predicted Outcomes and their true Per Cent Margin from Low Bid. A
negative correlation is expected--higher Predicted Outcomes should correlate with lower
Per Cent Margins.
By normalizing the Predicted Outcomes by both the low bidder and the average
bidder on each project, the correlations can also be run for each contractor. Once again, a
negative correlation between Predicted Outcome and Margin From Low Bid would
indicate that bidding outcomes on these projects are based on relative skills.
Population-wide trends can also be examined: does the correlation work better in
some types of jobs than in others? Are differences evident between large projects and
smaller ones? Are some contractors consistently bidding in line with, or out of step from,
their predicted ranks?
A strong correlation between the firms' calculated Predicted Outcomes and their
actual outcomes in bidding for the projects would indicate that a firm's skill level
relative to that of its competitors is a major determinant of its ability to win contracts; a
weak correlation, on the other hand, would indicate that other factors play a strong role in
determining which firm will be most successful in the bidding.
Core Competencies
This research project has also been developed to investigate evidence of Core
Competencies among contractors. The Eight Work Types have been identified as the
possible candidates for core competencies. This list is not intended as an exhaustive list
of all activities which a general contractor performs, nor are these activities necessarily
the most likely candidates for core competencies. They are, however, a set of common
construction and management activities which general contractors regularly perform.
This study will employ the three criteria for a core competency, as defined by
Prahalad and Hamel, in order to determine whether a contractor possesses a core
competency. In particular, the extent to which a contractor satisfies the three criteria will
be measured, and used to evaluate whether a core competency exists.
Criterion #1
The first core competency criterion, "provides access to a wide variety of
markets", can be measured by the extent to which the work types are found in various
different types of projects. Of the seven types of projects found in this study, the tunneling
activity was present in only two project types: three Sewer Pump Station projects and
found in four Mainline Sewer projects. Thus it seems that a firm with strong tunneling
skills has access to a rather narrow scope of potential markets, and it is questionnable
whether this category could be considered the basis for a core competency.
The mechanical equipment category is present in 16 of the projects, or 70%, which
cover five of the seven types of projects studied. Thus a heavy construction contractor
could expect to employ its mechanical equipment skills in several different project types.
All the other construction categories were virtually 100% represented in the projects, and
thus also meet the criterion for "providing access to a wide variety of markets".
The management-oriented work types--procurement/shop drawing management
and site/subcontractor management, also provide access to a wide variety of markets.
Indeed, a firm which possesses these two skills alone could effectively build any of the
projects listed simply by hiring and managing subcontractors and suppliers.
Furthermore, any general contractor which subcontracts out any portion of its projects
must possess these skills, and thus they both satisfy the core competency criterion.
Criterion #2
It appears difficult to assess to what degree the various contractors conduct the
given work types so as to "make a significant contribution to perceived customer
benefits". Indeed, the customer (the owner) has specified his needs exactly by way of the
plans and specifications. Furthermore, in terms of work put in place, there can be no
relative scale of providing benefits to the owner; a completed work segment either
satisfies the specifications, or it doesn't, as determined by the impartial judge (the
inspector). Therefore, it appears that any construction activity which is present in a
project will absolutely contribute to customer benefits, and those which are not present
cannot contribute to customer benefits whatsoever.
Nonetheless, the project difficulty survey is being presented as a possible relative
scale by which this second core competency criterion can be evaluated. As explained
above, the quality and definition of the final product is completely determined by plans
and specifications, and the only possible variation in contributing to "perceived
customer benefits" rests in the pricing which contractors apply to the work: lower cost
provides greater benefit to the owner. It is hypothesized here that difficult work types in
projects will create a wider range of pricing by the bidding contractors than easier ones,
because wider cost structures could be expected among the contractors. Thus work types
which more typically are ranked as high in difficulty are more likely candidates for
satisfying this second criterion as a core competency.
The procurement/shop drawing management activity contains a more readily
recognized scale for contributing to perceived customer benefits. A firm which
diligently researches all possible sourcing for a product may discover higher quality or
lower cost versions than its competitors. Construction contracts often contain "Value
Engineering" clauses, in which contractors can present less costly methods or products,
and the cost savings is shared between owner and contractor.
A firm which provides the equipment and methods as specified by project
guidelines has produced the minimum acceptable level, and probably doesn't meet this
second core competency criterion. Those firms which effectively research and present
alternative, and less costly, plans, on the other hand, will more suceessfully contribute to
percieved customer benefits. Thus while the construction activities depend on high level
of difficulty in order to contribute to customer benefits, the procurement work type is
linked to the contractor's perceived skill in performing this function.
Criterion #3
The third criterion for a core competency, a skill which is difficult for competitors
to imitate, will depend closely on the results of the contractor's skills survey. Firms with
a reported skill in a work type which is clearly higher than the reported skills of most of
the other contractors in the study will be deemed to have satisfied this third criterion for a
core competency.
Management Skills vs. Construction Skills
In Chapter 4, the survey responses and the personal interviews will be examined
together to evaluate the differences between management skills and construction skills.
The implications that management skills have on bidding will be examined. The Deer
Island construction projects may provide some added insights into this issue, since these
projects are widely believed to be management-intensive. Several "lessons learned" to
date on the Deer Island project will be discussed, as well as what these lessons indicate
about the upcoming Central Artery construction program.
Other Factors Which Influence Bidding
In Chapter 5, some other factors which influence bidding which are not skills-
based will be examined. To gain an industry perspective on these issues, personal
interviews were conducted with eighteen industry representatives (contractors,
subcontractors, owners, and engineers). The respondents provided opinions as well as
individual case studies of other possible influences on bidding. Two major themes were
explored:
The Role of Innovative Construction Methods in Bidding: Do firms often win
bids because they develop innovative methods which would provide significant cost
advantages? Is a firm's ability to innovate related to its skills? What are the
risks/rewards of innovation?
Bidding within the context of a larger construction program. The quantitative
research examined projects which were part of one large construction program (Deer
Island) and one small program (Wellesley Sewer Extension), as well as several
individual projects. Industry representatives were surveyed as to the different strategies
employed in single project vs. program bidding. The bidding in the two programs will
also be examined for possible trends.
Chapter 3: RESULTS OF RESEARCH
Core Competencies
Table XX lists the Reported Skill Levels of the twelve contractors in each of eight
work types. An average of 15 respondents rated each of the twelve contractors, with 4 the
low number of responses and 25 the high. The mean and standard deviations over all the
contractors in each of the worktypes was:
Mean Stand. Dev. Scale
Excavation 2.67 0.45 4=Most Skillful
Pipelines 2.41 0.72 3=Better Than Average
Tunneling 2.04 0.80 2=Average
Mass Concrete 2.82 0.4 1=Below Average
Thin Concrete 2.71 0.46
Site Mngmt. 2.70 0.50
Procurement 2.73 0.33
Mech. Equip. 2.62 0.48
This table indicates that contractors' skills in construction activities are roughly
correlated with the frequency that they are typically called upon to perform this work in
their projects: the contractors as a group were ranked highly in the work types which they
perform most often (Excavation, Concrete) but received lower scores in the works which
are more often considered specialties (Pipelines, Tunneling). The respondents were
asked to rank these contractors relative to industry-wide norms, and thus it is not
surprising that, as a group, they scored "above average" marks in each of the work
categories.
Table XX lists the results of the "Project Difficulty" survey for each of the twenty-
three projects. The mean and standard deviation results for each of the work types were
as follows:
Mean Stand. Dev. Scale
Excavation 2.25 0.52 4=Most Difficult
Pipelines 2.38 0.79 3=Very Difficult
Tunneling 2.59 0.52 2=Average Difficulty
Mass Concrete 2.06 0.63 1=Easier Than Most
Thin Concrete 1.98 0.58
Site Mngmt. 2.37 0.47
Procurement 2.41 0.44
Mech. Equip. 2.56 0.51
The same tendency can be seen regarding project difficulties as regarding
contractor skills: the construction work types which contractors performed most
frequently (excavation, concrete) were, on average, ranked "easier" than the "specialty"
work types (pipelines, tunneling, mechanical equipment).
Excavation. Mass Concrete. and Thin Concrete
These results provide a first insight into the existence of core competencies. Some
construction activities are regarded as commodities--that is, most firms within the
industry possess high levels of skill in those activities which are prevalent in nearly all
projects. Thus, in order to be a viable competitor in this market, a firm should possess
these skills in-house or create strategic alliances with firms that do. A low percentage of
the contractors were reported to typically subcontract out these work items, so it appears
that firms typically perform the work themselves. One possible explanation for this low
rate of subcontracting is that price competitiveness is lost if the General Contractor
applying the subcontractor's markup as well as its own to its bids.
Thus it appears that the Excavation, Mass Concrete, and Thin Concrete work
types are not likely candidates for firms' core competencies. Each of these activities
satisfies the first criterion: Provide access to a wide variety of markets, since the work
types were significant elements of all seven project types investigated. The three work
types vary in the degree to which they satisfy the second criterion: Makes significant
contribution to perceived customer benefits. Using the difficulty-based measure, as
discussed in Ch. 2, the reported average difficulty of the Excavation work type varied
between 3.33 and 1.40 among the projects, with a mean of 2.25. Similarly, the concrete
items varied between 3.22 and 1.00, with a mean of 2.00. All three work types were
present in nearly every project, and thus the only question regarding "contributing to
perceived customer benefits" is one of degree, not of whether or not the work types do
contribute.
Based on the results of the contractor skills survey, however, it appears that these
three work types fail the criterion that a core competency should be "difficult for
competitors to imitate". For the excavation rankings, the four highest contractors were
rated between 3.0 and 3.3, and the mean for the entire group was 2.67. The mass concrete
and thin concrete categories also each had four contractors rated between 3.0 and 3.6, and
the group means were 2.8 and 2.7, respectively. Most significantly, the standard
deviation of the scores in each of the categories were between 0.45 and 0.46, among the
lowest of all the work types. The relatively low standard deviations indicate a small
spread among the reported skills of these contractors in these skills. Thus it would
appear that the Excavation, Mass Concrete, and Thin Concrete work types fail the core
competency criterion that they be difficult for competitors to duplicate.
Pipelines. Tunneling. and Mechanical Equipment
A simple scan of the projects reveals that the specialized construction activities--
pipelines, tunneling, and mechanical equipment installation--are not as prevalent in
this market as the excavation and the concrete work. However, when they do appear on
the projects, they are typically perceived as more difficult than the excavation and
concrete items, and are more likely to be subcontracted out based on responses to the
Contractor Skills survey. Thus contractors which emphasize these skills in-house may
focus on a smaller subset of the market, and will be competing against contractors who
employ subcontractors in those work types when pursuing these contracts.
In terms of the first criterion, "Provides access to a wide variety of markets", the
tunneling work may be lacking, since it was part of only two of the seven types of projects
studied. The mechanical equipment activity was present in four of the seven project
types, and the pipeline work was found in all seven of the project types.
Similar to the discussion for the excavation and concrete work types, these three
work types all satisfied the second criterion, "makes significant contribution to
perceived customer benefits" to some degree. The reported difficulties and their
prevalence among the work types indicates that pipelines makes some contribution to
most of the project owners, but that the contributions of the tunneling and mechanical
equipment activities is stronger on the projects in which they are present (based on their
reported difficulties).
In terms of the third criterion, "difficult for competitors to imitate" two of the
specialty work types displayed much higher variability among contractors than the
commodity work types. The standard deviation of pipelines and tunneling was 0.72 and
0.80, respectively, while none of the other categories had standard deviations greater than
0.50. Three firms scored significantly higher than the rest of the group in both pipelines
and tunneling (Contractor D, Contractor F, and Contractor K). These three firms scored
between 3.17 and 3.5 in pipelines, where the mean was 2.41, and scored between 2.75 and
2.8 in tunneling, where the mean was 2.04. (The high marks of two national contractors
in these categories was used in calculating the averages, but will not be considered
significant because of the limited number of responses on which their scores are based.)
The mechanical equipment work type provided less indications of satisfying this
third core competency criterion. The mean score in this category was 2.62, with a
standard deviation of 0.48. One firm was ranked at 3.5 (based on limited responses),
while two others scored 3.0. The firm with the highest rank in this category is also a
national contractor, and actually competed for only four of the largest projects in this
study. This may put into question to what extent it satisfies the first criterion, "provides
access to a wide variety of markets" . Since it is not known to what extent this firm
employs its mechanical equipment skills to access other national markets, no further
comment can be made as to whether or not its high ranking in this work type is evidence
of a core competency.
Site Management and Procurement
The two "management" oriented work types, Site/Subcontractor Management
and Procurement/Shop Drawing Management, do not provide any clear indications for
core competencies among any of the contractors. Both work types clearly satisfy the first
two criteria for core competencies, but both seem to be lacking in the third criterion.
These two work types both "Provide access to a wide variety of markets", since a
firm which is highly skilled in these two areas could perform construction projects using
only subcontractor work. While this type of project management is more prevalent in
building construction than in the heavy construction markets investigated here, survey
respondents did indicate two firms which had occasionally managed projects in this
manner (Contractor B and Contractor E). The potential does exist, however, for more
firms to use this tactic.
These management work types also satisfy the second criterion of "makes
significant contribution to perceived customer benefits". The procurement/shop
drawing management activity provides contractors with an opportunity to satisfy the
owners needs in a variety of means. Equipment specifications, in particular, are often
written by naming one or two preferred manufacturers, along with the clause "or
approved equal". A firm which diligently researches all possible sourcing for a product
may discover higher quality or lower cost versions which the owner had not specified.
Construction contracts also often contain "Value Engineering" clauses, in which
contractors can present less costly methods or products, and the cost savings is shared
between owner and contractor.
Those firms which effectively research and present alternative, and less costly,
plans, on the other hand, will more successfully contribute to perceived customer
benefits. While such skill was not specifically surveyed, one would expect that if one
firm clearly outperformed the others in this capacity, it would be revealed in the skills
survey. Similarly, the third criterion, "difficult for competitors to imitate", should be
closely linked to the responses in both categories in the reported skills survey.
Over the entire group of contractors, both the "site management" and the
"procurement" skills were ranked rather highly (2.7, 2.73) with relatively low standard
deviations (0.50 and 0.33). Three firms were ranked between 3.0 and 3.5 in the site
category, while two firms were between 3.0 and 3.25 in the procurement category.
However, due to the high average marks and low standard deviation, it is unlikely that
any of these firms can be considered to have core competencies in these areas, save the
national contractor that scored 3.5 on the site management work type. However, this
firm's score was based on a limited number of survey respondents, and thus will not be
considered as a possible core competency.
Analysis of Core Competencies
Thus in reviewing the results of the surveys for the six construction work-based
work types and the two management-based work types, it is noted that three firms
potentially display core competencies in pipelines and tunneling. Are these likely to be
true core competencies? Why were no additional core competencies identified? These
two questions will be taken up in succession.
The three firms that were identified by survey as possibly displaying core
competencies in pipelines and tunneling work were highly competitive in all of the
projects in which tunneling and pipeline work was ranked as highly difficult. In the
four of the five sewer projects in which tunneling and pipelines were major portions of the
projects, these firms were the only members of the survey group which bid the projects;
furthermore, one of these firms was low bidder on all five of the projects. However, one
strong indication that these firms do hold core competencies in these work types is the fact
that they were successful in winning the projects against several other bidders (not
investigated) who specialized in pipeline and tunneling work.
The firms were also quite competitive in the projects in which pipelines and
tunneling constituted a smaller portion of the entire projects. In the four water treatment
structures projects in which pipelines or tunneling was ranked as highly difficult,
(Projects #1, #2, #13, and #17) the pipelines and tunneling actually constituted less than
25% of the total value of the projects. However, these firms were low bidder in two of the
projects, second low bidder in three of the projects, and third low bidder in two of the
projects. Of the twelve chances for these firms to bid in the top three, the firms actually
captured seven of those twelve positions, while each of the projects were bid on by an
average of seven contractors.
Thus it appears that these firms are able to leverage their skills in tunneling and
pipelines to compete against contractors who specialize in these two work types and to
acquire projects which involve a wide variety of work. These two characteristics
indicate that these firms do exhibit core competencies in these work types. The
contractors' core competencies were achieved by different means. Contractor K has
developed a strong strategic alliance with a strong international tunneling contractor to
win two projects which involved soft ground tunneling. The tunneling firm's obvious
tunneling capability, and Contractor Ks skills in a wide variety of projects, made this a
successful alliance. The two firms reportedly agreed to purchase a tunnel boring
machine which could be used in succession on both of the tunnels. Contractor D and
Contractor F developed their pipeline competencies in the 1970's, when both firms were
exclusively pipeline contractors. Contractor F has since diversified much more
significantly than Contractor D into other types of work.
Why were no other core competencies identified? It is probably not a coincidence
that the two most specialized work types were the only candidates for core competencies.
The three firms are known to pursue and win these types of projects far more frequently
than the others, and thus a respondent might rate them highly in these categories whether
or not they are actually skilled in them.
Furthermore, all of the other work types are fundamental to all the projects; if a
firm did hold a core competency in these categories, they would be expected to win nearly
every project they bid, and this was not the case (no firm won more than 35% of the projects
it bid). If the general contractors did hold other core competencies, they may likely be
less apparent to casual observers, and may be located more in separate individuals
rather than permeating the entire company.
Evidence of Skills-based Competition
Since the previous analysis turned up very little evidence that contractors possess
core competencies in any of the work types identified, differing levels of skill were
nonetheless identified among the contractors. Thus a more general question will now be
considered: Are the relative skills of the different contractors in these work types
associated with the firms' relative successes in bidding for projects?
As described in Chapter 2, correlations were run between contractors' calculated
Predicted Outcomes and their Margin From Low Bid on all the projects that each firm
bid. A negative correlation between these two variables would indicate evidence of
skills-based competition among the contractors, meaning that firms' successes in
bidding for contracts are related to their relative skill levels in the several phases of a
project. A firm's Predicted Outcome was a simple calculation which had the following
characteristics:
*firms which were highly ranked vis-a-vis the other bidders should
receive higher Predicted Outcomes; and
*Firms whose highly ranked work types most closely matched the work
types which were ranked as most difficult should receive higher Predicted Outcomes.
Project Correlations
Exhibits la to le tabulate the results of the "Project Difficulty" and "Contractors'
Skills" surveys, as well as the bidding results on the piojects. The data of the-Predicted
Outcome vs. Margin From Low Bid for each individual project are plotted in Exhibits 2a
to 21. The Ordinary Least Squares Regression Line is fitted to each of the data sets, and
the correlation coefficients have been calculated as the square root of the R^2 coefficient
of the regression. The residual values from the regressions have not been documented--
due to the calculation method for the predicted outcomes, it is not expected that the
residuals between Predicted Outcome and Margin from Low Bid would be consistent
from project to project.
The figures reveal that a Predicted Outcome is not well correlated with Margin
From Low Bid for most of the projects. Only two projects had correlation coefficients
between -0.5 and -1.0, and only nine other projects even had negative correlation
coefficients at all. Thus slightly less than half of the projects displayed any tendency for
firms with higher calculated Predicted Outcomes to bid at lower prices. The mean
correlation coefficient over the twenty-three projects was 0.04, and the standard deviation
of the values was 0.50.
The correlation coefficients of the five largest projects (valued between $39MM
and $188MM) were the best correlated with coefficients averaging -0.29, and three of the
values more negative than -0.39. The five pipeline projects were poorly correlated, with
four of the five more positive than +0.50. The six smallest structures projects (valued up to
$8MM) had an average correlation of +0.08, and the seven structures projects of
intermediate value ($10MM to $20MM) had correlations which averaged +0.10. The
eleven projects with the highest average worktype difficulties had correlations which
averaged -0.147, while the twelve projects with lower average difficulties had
correlations which averaged +0.266.
A readily apparent trend among these correlations involves projects in which
Contractor J was low bidder. Although the firm was ranked lowest in skills in five of the
eight work types, the firm was low bidder on three projects: #7, #14, and #15, with total
values of over $30MM. The three projects had correlation coefficients which averaged
+0.63, far above the population mean of 0.04. The firm's low predicted outcomes in its
winning bids slanted the correlation far to the positive.
The pipeline projects also had high positive correlations in four of the five
projects. These four were each bid by only three surveyed firms, and were characterized
by wide margins from low bid. The firm with the highest predicted outcome was well off
from low bid in each case, resulting in the strong positive correlations.
Contractor Correlations
The data was also analyzed for each contractor to determine whether some
contractors' bidding was more closely aligned with its reported skills than others. In
order to compare data points from different projects, each firms' Predicted Outcomes
were normalized in two different ways:
Normalizing Predicted Outcomes to the Low Bidder: Each Predicted Outcome
was taken as a ratio of the firm's score to that of the low bidder to achieve a "Normalized
Predicted Outcome". This method implicitly assumes that, from project to project, the low
bidders should have consistently high scores. Exhibits 3a to 3g reveal that four
correlation coefficients were between -0.40 and -0.50, one was -0.69, and five other
coefficients were negative. When plotting the results of all normalized data for all
contractors, the correlation coefficient was +0.19.
There did not appear to be any pattern to the correlations: the outcomes among the
various subgroups (national contractors, local contractors, low volume, high volume) all
appeared random. The findings of the project-based analyses were reflected among the
contractors, and those which bid some of the project subsets listed above typically
displayed the same tendencies.
Normalizing Predicted Outcomes to the Average Bidder: Each predicted outcome
was also normalized by calculating a firm's Relative Predicted Outcome the ratio of its
own Predicted Outcome to the average predicted outcome among all the firms which bid
the project. The results are shown in Exhibits 4a to 4g. This was done because it is
expected that a ratio taken on the average score would more consistently normalize the
scores than the single low bidder's score. Using this method, seven of the twelve
contractors had negative correlation coefficients, with only three of the contractors
having coefficients more negative than -0.375. The correlation between Normalized
Predicted Outcome and Margin From Low Bid was +0.063 over all of the contractors.
The results for the contractors between the two methods changed significantly in
six of the twelve contractors. Four of the contractors' correlations became more positive,
while two became noticeably more negative. Only one of these involved a change in
sign. Once again, no significant results were found when the contractors were
subdivided by volume or by geographic scope.
Bidders Vs. Non-Bidders
A final method of analysis for skills-based competition was to consider whether
differential skill levels affected the contractors' propensity to bid on the projects. Table
XX shows, for each project, the Predicted Outcomes of all surveyed contractors. The
Predicted Outcomes, in this case, are calculated based on the average reported skill
levels of all the contractors in the survey. This analysis controls for size of project
differences by excluding, for each project, contractors who have not performed any other
project within this survey of comparable size.
The table indicates that in 18 of the 23 projects surveyed, the average Predicted
Outcomes of the firms which actually bid the project were higher than the Predicted
Outcomes of those firms which did not bid the project (but had bid other projects of similar
size). Over all of the projects, the average Predicted Outcome of the group that bid for the
contract was 20% higher than that of the group which did not bid. Thus it appears that
skills-based competition is limited to determining which firms will actually bid a given
contract: those firms whose skills are poorly matched with the requirements of a given
project are less likely to submit bids on those projects.
Analysis of Skills-Based Competition
The basic outcome of this analysis is that although there appears to be differences
among contractors in their levels of skill in various types of work, these relative skill
levels do not significantly coincide with the firms' proximity to winning the bids. The
results were analyzed by type of project, average project difficulty, size of project, and
annual revenues of contractors. None of these subgroups displayed significant
correlations between Predicted Outcome vs. Bid Margin, and thus a more highly skilled
firm is not likely to perceive any tendency to bid more closely to the low bid vis-a-vis the
other firms who bid on the project. The only significant evidence of skills-based
competition was that firms whose skills closely match the project requirements (as
determined by difficulties) are more likely to submit bids than other firms. Several
factors could be the basis for this lack of evidence of skills-based competition:
Need For Work and Perceived Risk: As discussed in Chapter 1, the influence
which a contractor's need for work and perceived risk have on the contractor's bidding
has been well documented. The need for work phenomenon, in particular, could
negatively influence this study's results in two ways: a low-skilled contractor with high
need for work is likely to under bid more highly skilled firms; and a high-skilled
contractor with low need for work is likely to bid with very high mark-ups, in order to
reap windfall profits in the event that it does win the project. On the other hand, one would
expect the perceived-risk influence on a contractor's bidding to move in line with this
study: a firm which can apply highly skilled personnel to difficult components of a
project should perceive lower risk in that project, and thus bid at lower markups.
However, it is out of the scope of this project to actually measure this interaction.
Uniformity of Skills: The surveys did not reveal wide differences in skill levels
of the contractors in most of the selected worktypes. Thus, while differences do still
appear to exist among contractors, the differences are not strong enough to significantly
influence bid outcomes, which nonetheless vary widely. The likely causes of this
uniformity of skills is investigated in the next chapter.
Sources of Error: Several problems in the research method and analysis could
have negatively impacted the results:
1. Respondents to the questionnaires were typically not familiar with all the
projects or all of the contractors. Therefore, a true relative ranking of the contractor
skills and project difficulties could not be obtained. In particular, if a respondent ranked
only a certain subset of the contractors, that ranking will be valid only on projects which
were bid on by firms within that subset. Two naturally selected subsets became apparent:
in one subset, respondents were familiar with most or all of the local contractors; another
subset was respondents who were familiar with firms that performed work on Deer
Island.
2. The Ranking system used a narrow scale of measurement: the scales on both
surveys were 1 to 4, where 1 indicated easiest work type or least skillful contractor, and 4
indicated most difficult work type or most skillful contractor. The majority of the
responses were 2 or 3, and very few respondents used fractional ranks; thus most of the
data did not match Normal Distributions. Furthermore, there may exist finer
delineations among skills and difficulties than was reported in the surveys.
3. Respondents may naturally rank contractors according to the type of projects
that the firm wins, not the firm's true skill in performing the work. This would most
likely occur in situations where the respondent has not witnessed the firm in actual
project contexts and therefore bases his/her responses on bidding success. This
phenomenon would have most likely occured in the respondents who worked for one of the
general contractors(about 35% of the respondents). The other respondents--members of
subcontracting and engineering firms and owner representatives, would not be expected
to suffer from this phenomenon.
4. The eight worktypes may not be valid. The eight categories are not all-
encompassing nor are they likely to be mutually exclusive. Thus a firm's skill in one
area may be counted twice while other firms' relevant skills are ignored. Furthermore,
each worktype is granted equal weight in influencing a firm's Predicted Outcome on a
given project. The true weights of the worktype difficulties may not be equal (or linear,
for that matter), and may vary according to such factors as the prevalence of that
worktype on a given project.
Chapter 4: CONSTRUCTION SKILLS VS. MANAGEMENT SKILLS
This research project has attempted to measure the extent to which relative
differences in contractors' skills are reflected in contractors' successes in bidding for
contracts. The contractors' skills in a variety of construction and management
activities have been measured, as well as the level of difficulty of these activities within a
group of construction projects. The quantitative analysis described in Chapter 3
indicates that while contractors are perceived to have varying levels of skill in these
various functions, the differences do not appear to be correlated with their bidding
practices.
In this chapter, the differences in the contractors' skills in the construction and
management activities will now be considered. "Construction" activities here are
narrowly defined as activities which directly relate to putting constructed work in place,
while "management" activities include any coordinating activities which support
construction activities, but can be extended to procurement, owner reporting functions,
and other administrative functions. Personal interviews conducted with contractors,
engineers, subcontractors, and owners who work in this industry will be used as the basis
for the analysis.
The contractors' skills survey indicated that the contractors were rather
uniformly adept at three of the construction activities: Excavation, Thin concrete, and
Mass concrete, while wide variations existed in the two other "specialty" construction
worktypes, Tunneling and Pipelines. The three worktypes in which received contractors
received highest ratings are the most common of the construction activities, and were
found in significant quantities in nearly every project.
The contractors were also generally highly rated in the two "management"
worktypes Which were surveyed, Site/Subcontractor Management and Procurement/Shop
Drawing Management. The mean scores and the standard deviations in both these
categories were nearly identical to those of the three common construction activites listed
above. Thus it appears that most industry members surveyed felt that the three basic
construction worktypes and the two management activities were all conducted at rather
high levels among this group of contractors. This is not a surprising result, of course,
since these contractors are regarded as some of the best heavy construction contractors
who work in Massachusetts.
While the quantitative survey indicates consistently high management and
construction skills, most industry representatives nonetheless indicated that a wide
dichotomy of skills exists between these two types of activities. These comments were not
directed specifically at this group of contractors or at the work types identified here, but
seemed to apply more generally to all heavy construction contractors in the full variety of
tasks which they perform. The general consensus among respondents was that most
contractors held equal skill levels in performing actual construction activities, but that
wide variations did exist in contractors' management abilities. The two types of
activities will be considered in succession.
Contractor's Contruction Skills
In considering the firms that were examined in this study as well as other
contractors who typically perform medium to large heavy construction projects, virtually
all industry representatives indicated that little variation exists in contractors' skill
levels in the basic construction activities. The respondents felt that in most instances,
the firms would employ similar methods and would experience similar production rates
in performing any of a variety of construction activities. There appeared to be three basic
reasons why construction skills are uniform among heavy contractors: the skills are
fundamental to executing nearly all of the projects, the unskilled firms are usually
screened out, and the workers who perform the work have uniform training.
Skills are Common to all the Projects: The most common reason given for this
uniformity of construction skills is the fact that the construction activities are common
in nearly every project within this industry, and that the fundamental aspects of these
activities are identical in nearly all projects. Thus any firm which competes within this
market must have a high level of skill in these activities. Although these work skills
could be (and sometimes are) subcontracted out, the firm must still possess these skills
in-house, because:
*Subcontracting this work often leads to price non-competitiveness,
because the mark-up on that work is counted twice (in subcontractor's price and in
general contractor's price). The only means for guarding against this mark-up is to
have sufficient knowledge of the work type in-house, and use that to negotiate favorable
pricing from a subcontractor in need of work.
*The work types are critical to successfully completing most of the
projects listed, and the GC must therefore possess that work type skill in-house in order to
manage, and indeed replace, the subcontractor (in the case of the subcontractor's
failure).
The fact that many firms are successful in winning projects within this market
indicates that the basic construction skills required to perform these projects are widely
held.
Unskilled Firms are Usually Screened Out: Most respondents felt that a
threshold level of projects exists, which rather clearly restricts non-capable firms from
competition. The restriction mechanism is made up of several parts: bonding capacity,
prequalifications requirements, and firms' self-selecting restrictions.
Bonding: Firms which bid for public works projects must acquire two forms of
bonds, or surety. The bid bond is insurance to the project owner that if the contractor is
low bidder, it will agree to sign the contract and actually perform the work. The
performance and payment bond is insurance to the project owner and to the contractor's
suppliers and subcontractors that if the general contractor becomes financially
distressed or otherwise cannot complete the project, all of its project obligations will be
met. While the two forms of bonds are acquired at different times--all bidding
contractors will acquire bid bonds, but only the winning contractor then purchases the
performance and payment bond--the bonds are issued on the same criteria, and thus go
hand in hand.
In determining whether or not to provide a bond, a surety company evaluates a
contractor on three criteria. The firm's net worth and working capital are the financial
criteria: contractors are typically thinly capitalized, and a bonding firm evaluates what
assets could be liquidated in the event of financial distress. A common "rule of thumb"
is that firms are bonded for projects worth up to ten times their working capital. A surety
company also evaluates the firm's capabilities in the type of construction being
considered. Specifically, the number of similar projects the firm has constructed, and
the size of the largest similar project constructed are evaluated in comparison to the
project at hand.
Owners' prequalification requirements are also used to screen firms that are
allowed to bid. Owners employ various criteria: some examine a firm's net worth
(similar to bonding companies); other owners permit firms to bid on projects which are a
maximum of twice the size of the largest past similar project the firm has completed. In
lieu of the largest similar project, firms can often substitute the total value of similar jobs
completed within a twelve month period.
Other screening mechanisms also appear to limit contractors' participation,
although these are not full-proof. Several contractors asserted that most non-qualified
contractors will realize when a potential project outstrips their construction abilities, and
will not bid. This understanding is usually reinforced by an unqualified firm's venture
into more complicated projects: those that do survive the heavy financial losses and
frustration of a losing project will not quickly venture into that market again. Another
screening mechanism appears to be a firm's ability to attract competitve subcontractor
bids for the projects: subcontractors will also suffer when working for a non-qualified
general contractor, and one representative did acknowledge that this often results in the
GC receiving no-competitive quotes, if any at all.
Thus a firm which has not developed a proven track record in this type of work,
and thus is perceived to lack the necessary construction skills, will be blocked from the
competition by the surety firms, the project owner, and subcontractors.
Uniform Skills AmonE Workforce: The third reason cited for the uniformity of
skills in construction activities was the uniformity of skills among the unionized
workers that actually conduct the work. Ten of the twelve contractors in this survey were
full signatories to union agreements, and the other two firms used union labor on at least
some of their projects. Skills do vary among workers, to be sure, and contractors cited
attracting and maintaining competent workers as a common competitive strategy.
However, the union trades provide considerable, standardized training to their
members, and by hiring out of the union halls the contractors are assured of some
standard level of skill.
Where do construction skills reside? Most respondents indicated that the
knowledge and skills required to perform the actual cosntruction activities is held from
the superintendent level to the foreman level and down to the journeyman level. On
smaller projects, one superintendent may have responsibility for all construction
activities, while on larger projects the duties are divided (by discipline) among several
superintendents. The superintendents are typically either "career men" who have
worked their way up from the journeyman/foreman levels, or are engineers by training
who have made the leap into operations. Foremen are union members who receive little
more hourly pay than journeymen, but who perform more coordination and direction
functions and less actual construction work.
The availability of personnel and/or subcontractors who are highly skilled in the
construction activities varies with the prevailing economic climate of the industry. The
severe downturn in construction activity in Massachusetts since 1989 has clearly made
competent superintendents, foremen and journeymen readily available. The size and
geographic scope of the firms also influenced their ability to access highly skilled
superintendents: one of the national contractors reported regularly conducting wide
searches for superintendents in diverse markets, and through national head-hunting
firms. The talent searches of the local firms seemed confined to the New England
region.
Despite the uniformity of construction skills which most people perceived among
the competitors in this industry, the respondents also reported widely varying levels of
success among the contractors. While profit data was not available, members of each of
the four groups interviewed (project owners, engineering firms, subcontractors, and the
contractors themselves) reported that large differences exist in the contractors' abilities
to successfully execute projects. Many of the firms have strong reputations: some were
highly regarded, while others were the object of strong disparaging comments. The
differences in the firms' successes, however, are rooted not in their skills in performing
actual construction tasks, but in their abilities to perform the wide range of necessary
management functions.
Contractor's Management Skills
Although the surveys indicated little variation among the contractors in terms of
their skill in the two management work types, industry representatives nonetheless
believed that large differences in management skills are apparent. The management
activities which were discussed in interviews were not limited to the Site Management
and Procurement functions covered in the surveys. Instead, the industry representatives
refered to "management" as all activities which are required in order to allow the
workforce to actually perform the construction, from coordinating the work of different
crews, to procurement of subcontractors and suppliers, to performing administrative
work such as fullfilling reporting requirements to owners.
To successfully build a typical "heavy" construction project, a myriad of
information, personnel, activities, and materials must be brought together in a timely
and precise manner. After the project has been designed, the principal responsibility for
bringing these diverse elements together rests with the General Contractor, and the
General Contractor's ability to coordinate these "management" activities is thus the
prime determinant of the success of the project.
The management activities seem to encompass the activities which are typically
performed by superintendents, project managers, operations managers, and by support
staff such as engineers and accountants. The respondents also felt that the management
skills which a firm will display on a given project is strictly a function of the personnel
who are assigned to the projects, since construction projects are typically run as
autonomous units. In other words, management skill is not necessarily consistent
throughout a firm but instead varies from member to member.
The "project difficulty" surveys do not indicate significant variations among
projects in terms of the level of difficulty of the management activities. Once again,
however, industry representatives indicated in interviews that the difficulty of
management activities varies widely from project to project. The difficulty of
management activity is dependent on project characteristics such as the number of
different work activities which require coordination on the project, the ambient site
conditions in which the work must be performed, and owner-imposed requirements like
scheduling deadlines and reporting requirements.
What Makes a Project Difficult to Manage?
The Deer Island projects provide extreme examples of projects with very difficult
management activities. A site visit and a simple review of the general conditions of the
project specifications clearly supports this view. Contractors will build nearly $3 Billion
worth of projects on the tiny, 210 acre peninsula between 1990 and 1998, and virtually the
entire area will be covered by constructed facilities when the project is completed.
Contracts totaling more than $1.4 Billion have already been awarded, involving 31
contractors and 1,000 workers. The project presents several challenges to the
management capabilities fo the contractors:
High Subcontractor Coordination: the projects involve a wide variety of
structures which together will form a massive Waste Water Treatment Facility. Thus
most of the projects involve the basic construction activities--excavation and concrete
work--as well as large amounts of specialty work--mechanical equipment, piping,
electrical work, and most of the typical building trades (roofing, interior finishes, etc.).
These projects thus require lengthy procurement and shop drawing review activities, as
well as considerable scheduling and coordination of the actual on-site activites. This
can be contrasted with projects in which the contractor performs a limited amount of
different construction activities, primarily with its own forces--such projects will
require far less coordination and procurement.
Limited Work Areas: Each Deer Island contract provides a contractor with a
predetermined plot of land to use as an equipment yard, lay down and staging area, and
office trailers. Most contractors have refered to the available lay down areas--where
materials are stored and partial assembly of constructed works occurs--as severely
limited. The MWRA also acknowledges this fact, and has provided each contractor with
additional areas in Quincy, MA--a five mile barge ride away! The small work areas
also place a premium on subcontractor and worker coordination--most projects require a
wide variety of subtrades, and it is the contractor's responsibility for providing each
party adequate access to the work. Individual projects located in less-conjested areas
will not challenge a general contractor's ability to manage space as much as these
projects will.
Limited Access: Indeed, even though Deer Island is a peninsula, all project
materials must arrive by barge, a service run by the Authority. The number of truck
loads of materials each contractor is allowed to bring by barge is very small, and limited
according to the size of the contracts--the firm which is building the $189 MM Primary
Digesters is only allowed a maximum of seven truck loads per day. Furthermore, all
working and management personnel can only access the island by boat or bus service,
both of which leave at periodic, predetermined times. These projects thus require
impeccable planning for deliveries and worker access.
Scheduling and Coordination with Other Contractors: Since each individual
project is only part of the larger project, each contractor must meet milestones which will
facilitate coordination among the projects. Furthermore, the entire project is under a
court-ordered timetable for compliance with the federal CIean Water Act. In some cases
the contractors are under deadlines to complete phases of the project for tie-in by other
projects, while in other cases the contractor must meet milestones to give up control, or
assume control, of a given area of the project. Each milestone involves late penalties of
between $5,000 and $30,000 per day. The contractors must closely monitor the project
schedules in order to avoid these massive penalties.
Stringent Reoorting ReQuirements: The authority has established aggressive
minimum requirements for participation of women and minority workers in the project,
as well as the subcontracting of certain portions of the work to women and minority
owned business enterprises (MBE/WBE). The projects also require detailed safety
reporting and a Quality Assurance/Quality Control plan. As the work progresses, the
General Contractor must regularly submit to the authority the following reports for itself
and for its subcontractors:
*Affirmative Action Plan *Quarterly Projected Workforce Table
*Weekly Worker Utilization Report *Monthly Compliance Report
*Bi-weekly schedule updates *Weekly Workforce Statistical Report
*the Project Safety Plan *Contr. Monthly Procuremt. Summary
*Certificate of MBE/WBE Completion *Certificate of MBE/WBE Work Startup
*Documentation of Weekly Safety Meetings
*Quality Assurance/Quality Control Documentation.
The penalties for non-compliance to these reporting requirements include:
financial penalties equal to the greater of .01% of the contract price or $5,000, suspension
of periodic payments, or suspension of the work.
The contractor which is constructing one of the smallest Deer Island projects
provides a good example of the negative affect which these reporting requirements can
have on a project. The contractor has successfully built many projects similar to this
$300,000 pre-engineered metal building, and yet this project is two months behind
schedule and under a stop-work order due to the contractor's inability to acquire and
document sufficient MBE participation. All the Deer Island contractors interviewed
(four) indicated that the reporting requirements to the project owner and to the consulting
engineer greatly exceeds the requirements found on typical heavy construction projects.
Several contractors asserted that these management requirements are evident in
all projects, but that in the Deer Island work these skills are vital to successfully
conducting the work. In most project situations, most contractors with lower
management skills are able to make up for such shortcomings by pushing for more labor
productivity. However, without impeccable coordination of on-site personnel and
subcontractors, deliveries, space requirements, and authority compliance and reporting,
a Deer Island project is doomed to failure.
Are the Management Requirements Usually Reflected in Bidding?
Several industry members indicated that many contractors probably did not
correctly estimate the full costs of the additional management activities required. Most
construction contracts contain similar scheduling, safety, and MBE reporting
requirements, but are not usually enforced to the full extent of the specification. The Deer
Island construction manager, Kaiser Engineers, has enforced the rigid reporting
requirements, to the point where contractors felt the reporting requirements were the most
challenging part ofthe project. Many of the contractors' managers complained that they
"spent all of their management time in meetings with the construction manager." In
light of the other management challenges which these projects present, these time-
consuming reporting requirements could potentially cause even greater problems for the
contractors.
The reporting and coordination requirements of these projects thus requires far
more site management personnel than most contractors are accustomed to. While these
contractors would typically staff the projects with an approriate amount of
superintendents, these projects require full-time schedulers, safety coordinators, QA/QC
engineers, purchasing agents, and additional coordination staff. MWRA
representatives indicated a noticeable difference between the local and the national
contractors in terms of their project staffing. Apparently the larger, national contractors
have faced similar management requirements on other large projects, and thus staffed
their projects to satisfy their needs from the outset. The smaller local contractors, on the
other hand, fell behind schedule in several cases because their projects were initially
under-staffed.
Conclusion
Most industry personnel thus believed that the prime determinant of the likely
success of a project is the level of management skill which the project requires, and the
management capabililties of the personnel which are assigned to the projects. The firms
with the best managers are not always most successful in winning the bids, because the
costs of such management activities are more difficult to quantify than the costs of the
actual construction work. Furthermore, based on past experiences, contractors often do
not expect that the full extent of the reporting requirements will be enforced, and thus
under-bid these functions.
While industry members who were interviewed that managment capabilities
varied widely among contractors, they also indicated that most contractors were reported
to have similar levels of skill in performing actual construciton work. Several
influences within the market appear to put the construction skills of most of the
contractors on par: the skills are common to all of the projects, the firms must have
displayed these skills in the past in order to satisfy bonding requirements and owners
prequalification requirements, and the firms employ a uniformly trained source of
labor.
Chapter 5: Other Factors Which Influence Bidding
The Role of Innovative Construction Techniques in Bidding
Several owner's representatives and contractors cited a bidding firm's ability to
develop innovative construction solutions for the projects to be bid as an occassional
factor in producing a victorious bid. Of course, the differential value of the innovative
methods cannot be determined absolutely, since the intended methods of the firms that do
not win the bid are never revealed. Nonetheless, both the contractors and the owners cited
projects in which the contractor employed methods which differed significantly from
those that they had envisioned when the job was designed or bid. When asked for
examples of innovative methods, the responses seemed to fall into two separate
categories: those which were technically-based and those which were based on
construction methods. In both cases, the innovation provided primary benefits in
reducing labor costs.
One contractor cited a support of excavation technique involving massive steel
plates driven between supporting soldier piles by a backhoe, as opposed to lagging boards
hand-placed between the soldier piles by laborers. That solution involved technical
understanding--the plates can only be driven into certain soil conditions. Another
contractor mentioned a shoring system for elevated concrete slabs which could be moved
into position for subsequent pours with very little disasembly as an innovation based on
construction methods.
Where do innovative methods originate?
Several contractors cited their use of project managers and other operations-based
personnel as a key to generating effective ideas, and indeed, to produce accurate bids at
all. "An estimating staff must have links to actual cdonstruction...you won't get a good
bid if they (the estimators) are working in a vacuum," commented an estimating
manager from one of the surveyed firms. Indeed, two of the smaller firms reported
employing home-office personnel who split their duty between project management and
estimating. One of the largest firms, on the other hand, augments the efforts of its full-
time estimating staff with project managers and superintendents who are not currently
deployed on projects, including those who are candidates for the projects at hand, if it is
won.
Estimating personnel must have accurate, up-to-date cost information for various
types of work, to be sure. Generating creative construction solutions, however,
apparently involves more than simply using timely cost data. Several contractors felt
that developing new methods is basically a process of considering past techniques and
combining and/or altering them to fit the task at hand. The construction experience of
the estimators is vital to developing possible techniques and effectively evaluating them.
The input of several people with operations experience creates a "brainstorming"-like
atmosphere which results in better solutions than could have been achieved without the
operations perspectives, or if the members of the team had worked individually.
As a young scheduling engineer working for a large contractor, I personally had
a similar experience while working on a pre-bid schedule for a large highway tunnel. I
was shocked when the project manager who was slated to run the project (if the bid was
won) asked me what construction sequence I would use to build the job. In retrospect, I
now realize that the project manager solicited my opinion on the chance that something I
said would provide a slightly different perspective, and would help him build upon the
tactics that other members of the estimating team had already developed.
An Example of Innovation Leading to a Winning Bid
The bidding for the Phase 1 Residual Treatment Facilities on Deer Island
(August, 1991) is an extreme example of a contractor using innovative construction
methods to win a contract. The contract involved constructing several structures which
will treat the heavy sludge which settles out of the treatment plant's primary clarifying
process:
*six reinforced concrete gravity thickeners, measuring 73 ft. in
diameter and 30 ft. high;
*eight steel egg-shaped digesters, 90 ft. in diameter and 140 ft. high,
which will anaerobically stabilize the sludge;
*a sludge storage and pumping facility, a gas handling facility, and an
odor control and operations facility;
*and large amounts of piping and control equipment.
In relation to the other large Deer Island projects, this contract required relatively
little excavation, a moderate amount of concrete work, and massive amounts of pile
driving, mechanical piping and structural steel fabrication. The perspective of most of
the bidders was that the project would be subcontractor-intensive, as a result of the heavy
emphasis on the specialty trades. These specialty trades did not appear to provide any
opportunity for comparative bidding advantage: the large and complicated nature of the
work would prohibit most contractors from attempting this work themselves (in an effort
to seize the subcontractors' mark-ups).
The specialty subcontractors thus held a great deal of power in the bidding: since
each subcontractor could expect little, if any, competition, they could price the work with
high mark-ups and would easily resist any attempts at "bid shopping" once the contract
was bid. Due to the limited number of competitors, there was also no motivation for these
subcontractors to quote differing prices to different contractors: regarless of which GC
won the contract, each specialty subcontractor faced little competition and thus had a high
likelihood of being selected.
The steel digester construction, in particular, was generally believed to be a two-
firm competition between Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. and Pittsburgh Des Moines Steel
Co. These were the only two firms in the country that had built this type of digester before
(the former has done six previous digester projects, while the latter had done one).
Indeed, the contract specifications listed the two firms as the only allowable builders,
along with the clause "or approved equal".
For the bidding General Contractors, the competition for the project was thus
seemingly reduced to the fifty per cent of the project value which remained after these
specialty trades and filed sub-bids were deducted from the total price. The competition
was expected to be tight, since the moderate to easy nature of the concrete and the
excavation work did not provide comparative advantage to any firm.
However, the winning contractor employed its substantial engineering and
management capabilities, as well as its own corporate clout, to alter the competition in its
favor. Perini Corporation, of Framingham, MA, discovered two potential alterations to
the project which would result in substantial cost savings:
*the firm negotiated with General Dynamics for the construction of the
eight massive digesters at one of the firm's shipyards in South Carolina. Thus, instead
of having digesters built on Deer Island with union labor, they would instead be built in a
controlled shipyard environment, with less-expensive non-union labor, and then floated
to Massachusetts by barge. This tactic created an innovative method for delivering the
product in place.
*the firm employed its in-house geotechnical/foundation group to re-
design much of the project's foundations; specifically, the firm discovered that about half
of the proposed steel H-piles could be replaced with far fewer 48" concrete caissons,
providing another substantial cost savings. They also designed the landing pier to be
built off of Deer Island to receive the barges that would transport the digesters. This
innovation was technically-based in the firm's geotechnical capabilities.
A company representative reported that as a risk-hedging tactic, the firm did not
even reflect the full value of these cost savings in its bid. However, that company
representative as well as several other industry sources pointed to those two innovations
as the key to the firm winning the contract at $189 MM, $3 MM below the second bid.
Theoretically, any other firm could have developed either one of these tactics as
well, and eliminated Perini's comparative advantage. I point to several of this firm's
corporate assets as the reason why it alone developed the plans, and employed them to
achieve low bid. First of all, it had design resources available in-house which could be
assigned to the foundation re-design in the short amount of time in which the firms had to
bid; other firms would need to contract out and wait for the designer to become available;
secondly, as a firm with $1.2 billion annual revenues, it has the financial strength to
convince a firm like General Dynamics that its idea was feasible, and to invest its own
resources in pursuing this opportunity. General Dynamics may not have trusted some of
the smaller firms as stable contracting partners.
Third, and most importantly, Perini has the corporate stature, or "clout",
required to successfully negotiate these changes with the several impacted parties. The
firm had to negotiate with the MWRA as well as the Army Corps of Engineers for the
right to build the large landing pier off of the island. Perini also had to refute the claims
of several parties that its bid was "non-responsive", and thus should be thrown out:
*the local boilermaker's union, which stood to loose the 100+ new jobs
which the on-island construction method would have created. The union attempted to
rally public support against Perini for sending these jobs, and the rate payer's tax money,
out of state. *Other general contractors, and the two pre-qualified digester
manufacturers, who argued that General Dynamics did not meet the specifications as a
competent subcontractor, since it had never built any type of sludge digester before.
In short, Perini was the low bidder on this project for two reasons: it employed its
managerial and technical assets required to develop these innovative methods; and its
managers believed that it had the corporate clout required to preserve these innovative
methods in the face of the strong opposition that they knew it would create.
What are the Risks of Bidding Based on Innovative Methods?
Of course, a contractor faces risks when bidding a job based on an innovative
method, since construction methods often require the engineer's or owner's approval
prior to implementing it. If the owner does not approve of the new technique, the firm
could face losses equal to the amount of the projected savings it entered into the bid.
The bidding for one of the Wellesley Extension Sewer projects provides a clear
example of the risks associated with innovative methods. The project involved
installing the 60" sewer by standard pipe laying methods, and by tunneling through one
area which could not be disturbed.
The contractor which was low bidder based its bidding price in the tunneling
portion of the contract on a "pipe-jacking" method to install the tunnel, since the firm had
performed similar work for smaller tunnels. Pipe jacking involves shoving
consecutive lengths of steel casing forward with high pressure jacks, and then removing
the material encountered. Apparently, all the other contractors based their prices on the
traditional "liner plates" method of tunneling, where material is first removed, and
plates are then set into place to maintain the edges of the tunnel.
As a result, the winning contractor's price was 20% below that of its competitors.
During subsequent negotiations with the owner (MWRA) and its engineer, the firm was
barred from using the pipe jacking method because of doubts that the pipe jacking could
negotiate a proposed curve in the tunnel. Attempts to redesign the tunnel path to make it
more conducive to pipe jacking installation was also refuted by the authority, and the
contractor was forced to revert to the more costly liner plate method.
Bidding in Large Program Environments
Bidding within the context of large programs or "mega-projects", where several
projects of a similar nature come available for bid, provides contractors with
opportunities for competitive advantage which are not available in one-time bidding
situations. Some of the projects examined in this study were part of two large programs:
five consecutive pipe-laying and tunneling projects made up the Wellesley Sewer
Extension program, and ten other projects involved the construction of various sewerage
treatment structures on Deer Island.
The similarities of the various projects within a program, and the repeat
opportunities to win projects that the program provides, are important characteristics
which firms can use to develop bidding strategies. Contractors who have worked within
both of the above-mentioned programs cited two opportunities for advantages which arise
from bidding within programs: the opportunity to acquire additional knowledge about
competitors, and the opportunity to acquire additional information about forthcoming
projects. The potential for gaining information which will lead to comparative
advantage in bidding is determined by the extent to which the conditions of the contracts
are similar (e.g. owner's special provisions or geotechnical conditions) and the extent to
which the actual work types to be performed are similar.
Acauiring Information About Competitors
By competing within a program environment, firms are able to monitor the
bidding tendencies of of others, and are also able to monitor the methods and the
successes of the firms that actually win the contract. When the type of work and the
anticipated competition on future projects is the same as on past jobs, opportunities
theoretically arise for firms to forecast others bids, and use that information to predict
others future bids.
For example, in the Wellesley projects, all five contracts involved laying large
diameter pipe, building cast-in-place concrete junction chambers, and other special
construction like river crossings and tunneling. Each of the first three contracts was
won by a separate party, and in carrying out their own projects each firm was able to
monitor the progress of their competitors' forces. Indeed, the progress of each contractor's
crews was mapped on a daily basis on a wall at the inspecting engineer's main field
office, in plain public view. In this extreme example of monitoring one's competitors,
anyone could determine rather precisely a contractor's actual costs in the various
operations, and the mark-ups the contractors used in their bids.
These pipeline projects also provided strong opportunities for gamesmanship
because the bids were submitted under unit price contracts. Under this method of
contract, each type of work is bid at a unit cost and multiplied by an anticipated quantity
to reach a cost for that work type. These costs are then summed to determine total bid
price. Thus, except where bid prices are unbalanced or marked-up at different rates, any
firm could evaluate other firms' anticipated costs rather closely.
One of the competing firms' estimating managers commented, "By the time the
last contract was bid, we all knew each other's past bidding and actual production. It
came down to a question of which contractor was willing to do it for the lowest profit."
Other members of that firm, whose bid was in second place by 3.3%, felt that the winning
contractor had bid at costs which slightly undercut the second place firm's actual past
productivity, rather than bidding at its own anticipated productivity. These members
asserted that the tactic resulted in lower, but still positive, profit margins, and allowed the
firm to win the project.
The unit price contracts for the Wellesley Sewer projects, and the limited number
of work types involved, created strong opportunities for competitive advantage in
bidding. However, most public works projects are bid on a lump sum basis, and often
involve a wide variety of work types, including subcontract work. The large number of
the wait-and-see strategy. As reported previously, each of the first three contracts bid in
the first two months of the Wellesley program was won by separate contractors, and in the
Deer Island projects, each of the first eight large (over $10 MM) structures projects bid
within a ten month period was won by a separate contractor. This pattern may be an
indication of the need-for-work phenomenon: each firm, by landing one of these sizable
projects, may have neared its capacity and thus submitted high prices to compensate for
the lower productivity it would achieve in the subsequent projects. However, instead of a
manifestation of the Need-For-Work phenomenon, I attribute this phenomenon to the
learning, and thus risk-mitigating, effects which contractors perceive as they perform
their first contract within a mega-project.
In bidding, each contractor makes its best-guess estimate of a project's true
construction costs, and based on past experience, knows that the true project costs will
vary from this estimate by an unknown amount (positive or negative). The firm's
managers also understand that a possible reason why it was low bidder on the contract
was because it underestimated some future costs. Thus rather than risk winning another
project with cost calculations which are too low, in bidding subsequent projects the firm
will place higher costs on the work phases with the highest possible variability, and/or
will place higher general mark-ups on the bid. The firms are aware that several
contracts remain to be bid, and thus are still provided ample opportunity to participate
once its true costs are assessed.
This trend seems to be substantiated in the bidding of the eight large Deer Island
structures projects. Figure XX shows each winning firm's average margin from victory
in the bids subsequent to the one it won, as opposed to its margins in the projects it bid
previous to its victorious bid. The per cent contribution which the winning bid will make
to each firm's annual volume is also shown.
Of the five contractors who bid on projects before and after the project it won, the
Margins From Low Bid of four of those five firms was lower on the pre-winning bids than
variables in such bidding would seem to preclude any contractor from predicting
competitors upcoming bids based on past bidding/performance. Indeed, two contractors
representatives working on Deer Island projects asserted that most contractors will not
even consider other contractors' possible bids, except in the case of projects with only one
other bidder.
However, contractors did mention another type of information which can be
acquired from competitors in program environments: the ability to evaluate the methods
and results of the competitors' forces, and of their subcontractors, in various work
phases. When working in close proximity, contractors can monitor other firms'
productivities (and indeed, often hear of the same "through the grapevine") and can use
that knowledge in upcoming bids.
For example, much of the Deer Island work is founded on a deep clay stratum,
and a high uncertainty existed among bidding contractors as to the clay's resistance to
pile driving. In particular, one firm's field personnel reported that the pile driving work
on their project was bid at a rate of eight piles (each 90 ft. long) per crew-day, but that
actual production to date is at twenty piles per day. They fully expected that most bids for
future projects on the island would reflect the productivity which they achieved.
Does the Timing of Projects Affect Bid Prices?
The bidding for projects within a program appears to be influenced by the timing
of the projects. Specifically, each contractor's individual need for work and perceived
risk of the project are influenced by the timing of the project, and thus affect their
bidding. In evaluating one's competitors, a contractor should consider its opponents'
need for work. A contractor with a large pool of idle manpower and equipment will often
bid at lower profit margins in order to hold on to talented personnel, and to recoup fixed
costs on equipment.
Furthermore, a close examination of the contractors' bidding within the two
programs appears to also reflect a risk averse strategy in their bidding which I will call
on the post-winning bids. For these five firms, their average pre-win margin was 5.6%,
while their post-win margin was 12.7%. When the margins of the other contractors (those
who have not won projects, or whose winning projects were the first or last projects they
bid) are included, the average pre-win margin becomes 6.6% and the average post-win
margin becomes 11.8%. The need for work phenomenon is clearly not influencing the
firm's bidding, since for the five firms which had pre- and post-win bids, their winning
bids were projected to add 8% to their annual revenues.
I attribute this phenomenon of higher bids after having won a project than before
winning one to the firms' waiting for additional information in order to reduce risk.
Rather than expose itself to another project which has the same possible estimating flaws,
the firm will get a reasonable picture of its true costs within the first year of its project.
During that first year, the firm will have performed all the buyouts of subcontracted work
and materials, and will most likely have performed substantial portions of several
phases of the project. That data can then be used to bid subsequent projects within the
program with far less potential error in its pricing. The contractor also understands how
many more projects will be bid within the mega-project, and thus will only pursue this
wait-and-see strategy if a large quantity of projects remains to be bid.
When asked to characterize the expected future trend of bidding for the Deer
Island projects, contractors' and owner's opinions varied widely. Some respondents
mentioned that the difficult working conditions provided by the tight project area, the
difficulties in bringing equipment and supplies, and the construction manager's
stringent administrative reporting requirements would lead most current contractors to
forsake bidding on future work, except at high mark-ups. Others stated that the vast
availability of national contractors to perform the work will continue to bring in new
firms.
My opinion as to which firms will win future contracts depends on what markups
the current firms have employed, and how much success they actually attain on current
projects. I believe that contractors currently working on the island do still maintain an
information advantage over those who are not. These working contractors will have
their own true experienced costs to provide information for future bids, and have some
"through the grapevine" information of other contractors' experienced costs on other
projects. Contractors that have been shut-out, on the other hand, have only bid price
information on these contracts.
Current contractors will win repeat contracts only if their experienced costs have
come in below bid levels. Under that scenario, the contractors will then bid at lower
prices--unit costs are lower, reducing the cost portion of their bids; and risk is reduced as
a result of less possible variability in the project's outcome, thus reducing mark-ups.
This downward pressure on bids should prevent other contractors from breaking into the
future projects, even if they adjust their bids to reflect pricing information on past bids.
However, if current contractors' experience results in cost overruns, their future
bids will be higher to reflect that project-specific information. Contractors that were
previously shut-out will not have that information, and will price contracts based on the
company's historical productivity. This information assymetry will result in a constant
supply of new contractors winning contracts on the island.
The adverse economic conditions under which all of these projects have been bid
may lead to the latter scenario of many new contractors winning projects. The low
mark-ups which many contractors reported applying to their winning bids will
inevitably lead some contractors to sustain losses on these projects, since the low
contingency values in those markups will not cover all unforeseen problems. Once
again, the information assymetry will lead current contractors to bid at higher levels
than newcomers.
Chapter 6: CONCLUSION
The findings of this research project provide several insights into the nature of
the competition among the general contractors in the public works construction market
in Boston. The findings of this report are applicable to the Central Artery/Tunnel
construction program which is due to commence in Boston in 1992. The report also has
implications for the entire Boston market and other public works construction markets.
Central Artery/Tunnel
This report provides several insights into what contractors can expect in the
upcoming Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) construction program. This project will
replace the current Interstate 93 through downtown Boston with a tunnel, thereby
unsnarling the daily traffic jams on this road by widening the road and providing better
access at all the on-ramps and off-ramps. The interchanges with 1-90 and Route 1, at
either ends of the project, will also be rebuilt, and 1-90 will be extended to Logan Airport by
means of another tunnel through Boston Harbor.
The project, valued at $6 Billion, will be subdivided into sixty contracts, ranging
in value from $2MM to $300MM. Although the project involves an entirely different type
of structure, the CA/T project will nonetheless have many of the same features of the Deer
Island project:
Work Types: The contracts will feature massive amounts of excavation and
concrete work. The excavation work will likely be more difficult than in the Deer Island
projects, since much of it will be performed in a mining fashion to preserve the surface
vehicular traffic. The concrete work will be "thin" concrete, for vent buildings and other
smaller structures, and "mass" concrete, since the floors and walls of the tunnel will
vary from four to twelve feet thick. High subcontractor coordination will be required, as
the specialty trades will be installing tunnel lighting, ventilation, and fire suppression
systems.
The contracts which precede the actual construction of the tunnel will involve
relocating several large diameter sewer lines as well as the myriad other utlities which
currently run in the proposed path of the tunnel. The large diameter sewer work will
involve both tunneling and open trench techniques, and will differ from the Wellesley
Sewer Extension work only in the space limitations which these projects will cause.
Working Areas and Access: The projects will take place in some of the most
conjested areas of downtown Boston, surrounded by high-rise office towers and heavy
vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Much of the work will be perormed directly below the
existing Central Artery, an elevated, six-lane steel struture which must be kept in
operation while the tunnels are built. The tunnel construction will be performed by cut-
and-cover methods, but will resemble a mining operation in many cases because
teporary surface roadways will be put in place while the underground structure is being
built. All of these factors will result in highly restricted laydown and staging areas for
the work. The notorious traffic jams which afflict the roads in and around this project
will also pose serious challenges to timely deliveries of materials, equipment, and
workers.
Scheduling and Inter-Droiect Coordination: These projects will also be under
very tight schedules since the Deparment of Public Works will attempt to limit the
duration of the negative impact which this work will have on the downtown area. Many
projects will likely have adjacent projects ongoing concurrently, and will be subject to
intermediate and final milestones, complete with severe penalties for late completion.
Reporting Requirements: This project is also under the direction of a
construction manager, in this case Bechtel/Parsons Brinkerhoff. The contractors can
expect many of the same extensive reporting requirements in minority worker and
MBE/WBE participation, Quality Assurance/Quality Control, and scheduling updates.
What Projections Can Be Made About the Central Artery Project?
The results of the Core Competencies and Skills-Based Competition analyses, as
well as some of the qualitative aspects of the competition in heavy construction, provides
contractors with several suggestions on how to best prepare to participate in the upcoming
Central Artery projects, and provides clues of what can actually be expected in the
competition.
Core Competencies
None of the current competitors in the Boston Public Works Construction market
appears to display core competencies in the excavation and concrete worktypes. Thus it
could be expected that, among this group of contractors, competitionwill be tight, with no
single firm holding a dominant position in the main tunnel contracts.
Three firms have displayed core competency-like characteristics in large diameter
pipelines and tunneling work. Thus it could be expected that these three contractors will
be the leading competitors, and winners, in the utility relocation projects.
Skills-Based Competition
Among contractors which actually bid on a project, there will not appear to be any
skills-based differences in their bid prices. The skills of the bidding contractors will
often be comparable, and yet bid prices will fluctuate widely. Of all the competitors in the
Boston market, however, those whose skills more closely match the requirements of these
projects will be much more likely to bid on the projects than those whose skills are not
well-tailored.
Construction Skill vs Management Skill
Both sets of skills will be essential for firms to participate in the Central Artery
projects. Firms must establish and display competent levels of construction skill in
order to receive bonding from surety companies, in order to be prequalified by the owner,
and in order to receive competitive bids from subcontractors. For firms whose
construction skills do not approach the skill levels currently found in the market, it is
probably too late to develop those skills now. Firms whose construction skills are close to
market levels can improve their competitive position for the later projects by capturing
projects which involve large amounts of excavation and concrete work. The projects to
pursue should be as large as their bonding and prequalifications will allow, in order to
improve their bonding and prequalifications positions for the future.
Firms who already participate fully in this market (and thus exhibit typical skill
levels) can expect most other full competitors to possess similar levels of construction
skill. These competitors can still improve their competitive position by attracting and
retaining competent superintendents, foreman, and journeymen now; even though
skills are now reported to be uniform and readily available among these workers, the
simultaneous execution of both the Deer Island and Central Artery projects in the next
several years will put a severe strain on the availability of competent workers.
Management skills will be a prime determinant of the ultimate success of the
firms that actually win Central Artery contracts. All firms who expect to compete should
hire and train the necessary set of purchasing agents, scheduling engineers, QA/QC
engineers, and accountants, in order to have these people prepared for the various
management challenges which the projects will afford. Firms should also hire project
managers and superintendents with proven track records of managing projects with
severe space and access limitations, high scheduling and coordination requirements,
and large excavation and concrete work. It is imperative to hire these personnel now, to
train them on the necessary company and project procedures, so that they will be at full
productivity when the project commences.
Other Factors Which Influence Bidding
In preparing bids for the Central Artery contracts, firm should involve project
managers and superintendents in the estimating process in order to fully explore the true
requirements of the projects. The estimating staffs should also constantly search for
innovative methods which will provide their firm with a bidding advantage. The
Central Artery contracts will all contain Value Engineering clauses, so that innovative
methods will at least be considered by the owner. However, firms should not price
contracts according to the full savings of their innovative methods, to hedge against the
risk of the owner rejecting their innovations.
The contracts will likely be bid at higher margins than the Deer Island work,
since the two large programs will be ongoing concurrently, and most firms will perceive
lower need for work pressures. The first several contracts will each likely be one by
different contractors, as contractors employ a wait-and-see strategy to assess the true
costs of the work.
Firms should gather all available information to assess the true cost structures
and successes of the contractors who win projects. In the pipeline projects, firms should
be able to calculate the actual costs of working contractors, and may be able to impute
future pricing. However, each firm should not price future contracts according to
competitors' habits, unless the number of competitors is very small. In the larger
projects, firms must monitor working contractors' methods and successes on as many
worktypes as possible, in order to infuse as much information into subsequent bids as the
working contractors will. This information gathering can make firms more price
competitive and can avoid the same future losses that working contractors incurred.
Summary
The findings of this research project are as follows:
Core Competencies: While core competency-like phenomena were found on a
limited basis (pipelines and tunneling), there was no wide-spread evidence of core
competencies among these firms in the eight worktypes examined. That does not
necessarily mean that these firms do not hold core competencies; more likely, it is an
indication that the competitive bidding system is structured such that core competencies
are not apparent when bidding results are analyzed. Core competencies may have been
more apparent if one could have controlled for each firms' need for work influences;
furthermore, a closer look at these firms' operating practices may well indicate that core
competency-like practices are evident after the firm has won a project.
The eight worktypes could also be improper candidates for core competencies: the
eight functions are all very common elements of the firms' operations, and the slow rate
of technological innovation in these areas could preclude any one firm from holding a
clear competitive advantage. By definition, a firm with core competencies holds a clear
advantage over its competitors based on that dimension. However, with these selected
worktypes being so fundamental to each firms' operations, and with so many firms
actively competing in this market, it is not surprising that more firms did not exhibit
core competencies in these worktypes.
Skills-Based Competition: Based on the results of the Contractors' Skills and
Project Difficulty surveys, the firms which scored the highest Predicted Outcomes did not
have any significant tendency to bid more closely to the low bid on the 23 projects
examined. Predicted Outcome was a simple scoring formula which is higher for firms
with higher ranked skills, and for firms whose highly ranked skills more closely match
the high-difficulty elements of a project. This scoring device could be flawed because it
gives equal weight to each of the worktypes on every project, and because the surveys may
have been flawed by a narrow ranking scale and other respondent biases.
The Margin from Low Bid variable in this analysis is also subject to several
-external influences: the firms' bid prices are the only determinants of the winning
bidder, and as a result the bidding firms alter their price markups based on need for
work. If the firms' actual estimated direct costs were available, they might correlate
more closely with Predicted Outcomes, if in fact the firms' cost experiences (which are
used in future estimates) are dependent of reported skill levels. However, even the direct
cost portion of this analysis could be flawed, in the case where more highly skilled firms
are able to better estimate all future costs than less skilled firms.
The only significant finding from the analysis of skills-based competition was
in a firm's propensity to bid on a project: of the twenty-three projects examined, the
average Predicted Outcome of the firms which bid on the project was higher than the
Predicted Outcome of those that did not bid (after controlling for firms' size of project
limits). This seems to indicate that firms whose skills clearly do not match the project
requirements will not even bid the project, because of the low probability of winning the
project at an acceptable price.
Construction Skills Vs. Management Skills: In discussions with several
engineers, contractors, subcontractors, and owners, the relative degree and importance
of construction and management skills was explored. The consensus among industry
members was that the skills of actual construction work do not vary widely among most
firms, and that the difficulty of the construction activities on different projects are not the
prime determinant of the outcome of the project. Instead, the variation in management
skills among contractors is readily apparent, and the extent to which a contractor's
management skills matches the management requirements of a given project will
likely determine the outcome of the project. The implication for public works contractors
is that attracting and training competent managers is critical to the success of the firm.
Other Factors Which Influence Bidding: As a result of the skills-based
competition analysis, in which contractor skills did not seem to influence bidding
outcomes, several industry members were questioned as to what other factors might
-influence bidding. Two common themes emerged: first, firms sometimes develop
innovative construction methods which provide an advantage in pricing a given job.
Secondly, by working in a large program environment, firms are able to acquire new
information about upcoming projects based on past similar projects. Both of these effects
appear to be random, and cannot be predicted in advance. They can provide strong
advantages in bidding, however, and should be considered on every project.
Conclusion
The findings of this report indicate that competition among general contractors
in public works construction is not an orderly, or rational, process. The results of the
firms' competitive efforts in bidding are not determined by a few overriding forces, nor
are they controlled by some notion of relative skillfulness among the contractors.
Instead, among the large number of competitors, no firm holds a dominant position and
the outcomes of the competition are likely determined by the sum of the firms'
innovations, gambles, and errors.
The cause of these seemingly random competitive forces appears to be the
fragmented nature of the industry. The mature industry has many competitors, there are
virtually no proprietary technologies, and there are low barriers to entry into the industry
and between the geographic markets of the industry. The basis for competition is thus
reduced from core competencies and relative skills to more basic forces like firms' need
for work, perceived risk, and isolated advantages like project-specific innovations and
the ability to acquire project information in advance.
REFERENCES
Engineering News Record, (1990). "The ENR Top 400 contractors," Engineering News
Record, April 4, 1990.
Kosowatz, John J., (1991). "Harbor Cleanup Builds Momentum,", Engineering News
Record, Oct. 21, 1991, pp.2 8-3 2.
Macomber, J. D. (1989). "You Can Manage Construction Risks," Harvard Business
Review Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 155-165.
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (1991). "Boston Harbor Project: Fourth
Annual Contractor's Forum," December, 1991.
Massachusetts Department of Public Works (1991). Central Artery/Tunnel Project:
Construction Contracts and DBE Briefing," October, 1991.
de Neufville, R. and King, D., "Risk and Need for Work Premiums in Contractor
Bidding,"Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 117, No. 4, pp.
659-673.
Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, Gary, (1990). "The Core Competencies of a Corporation,"
Harvard Business Review, May, 1990, pp. 79-90.
"PROJECT DIFFICULTY" SURVEY RESULTS
EXCAVATION TUNNEL THIN CONC PROCURE # OF
PROJECT PIPELINES MASS CONC SITE MGT MECH EQL SURVEY
1 3.33 3.00 2.50 3.22 2.78 2.89 2.67 2.78 9
2 3.18 3.07 3.14 2.76 2.38 2.56 2.31 2.19 17
3 2.88 2.82 2.35 2.35 2.31 2.23 2.38 1 3
4 1.80 1.67 2.05 2.23 2.55 2.90 2.80 11
5 2.43 2.86 1.67 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.14 7
6 2.83 2.33 1.83 1.50 6
7 2.50 2.17 2.30 2.11 2.38 2.30 2.56 1 0
8 1.71 1.30 2.00 2.10 3.00 3.18 3.14 1 1
9 2.64 2.40 2.54 2.63 3.00 2.91 3.00 1 2
10 2.00 2.13 2.00 2.00 2.44 2.69 2.50 9
1 1 1.80 1.17 2.80 2.60 2.90 2.88 3.13 5
1 2 1.86 1.25 1.93 2.21 2.86 3.00 3.43 7
1 3 3.00 2.80 2.50 2.95 2.41 2.95 2.82 2.86 11
1 4 2.09 3.09 2.10 1.90 2.41 2.41 2.30 11
1 5 2.00 1.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.33 5
16 1.44 2.00 2.41 2.18 1.70 1.78 1.67 11
17 2.67 3.11 2.50 2.28 2.44 2.56 2.56 9
1 8 2.00 3.25 3.13 1.17 1.00 2.63 2.50 8
19 1.86 3.13 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.50 1.71 8
20 2.00 3.13 2.75 1.20 1.00 2.50 2.50 8
21 2.00 3.13 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.63 2.29 8
22 2.00 3.00 1.25 1.00 1.75 2.14 9
23 1.80 1.00 1.60 2.00 1.80 1.80 1.60 5
AVER. 2.25 2.38 2.59 2.06 1.98 2.37 2.41 2.56 9.13
ST. DE\ 0.52 0.79 0.52 0.63 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.51 2.85
4=Most Difficult 2=Average Difficulty 1=Easier Than Most
EXHIBIT lb
PROJECT WORK TYPE WEIGHT FACTORS
EXCAVATION TUNNEL THIN CONC
MASS CONCPROJECT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
1.48
1.41
1.28
0.80
1.08
1.26
1.11
0.76
1.17
0.89
0.80
0.82
1.33
0.93
0.89
0.64
1.18
0.89
0.82
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.80
SITE MGT MECH EQP
1.26
1.29
1.18
0.70
1.20
0.98
0.91
0.55
1.01
0.89
0.49
0.52
1.18
1.30
0.42
0.84
1.31
1.36
1.31
1.31
1.31
1.26
0.42
0.97
1.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.97
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.21
0.62
1.06
0.97
0.00
0.00
1.56
1.34
1.14
0.99
0.81
0.00
1.11
0.97
1.23
0.97
1.36
0.93
1.43
1.02
1.16
1.17
1.21
0.57
0.58
0.58
0.48
0.61
0.78
1.40
1.20
1.19
1.13
1.01
0.00
1.07
1.06
1.33
1.01
1.31
1.12
1.22
0.96
1.21
1.10
1.15
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
1.01
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PIPELINES
PROCURE
1.22
1.08
0.97
1.07
0.90
0.77
1.00
1.26
1.26
1.03
1.22
1.20
1.25
1.02
1.01
0.72
1.03
1.11
0.63
1.05
0.69
0.74
0.76
1.10
0.96
0.92
1.20
0.89
0.62
0.95
1.32
1.20
1.11
1.19
1.24
1.17
1.00
0.97
0.74
1.06
1.04
0.71
1.04
0.95
0.89
0.75
1.08
0.85
0.93
1.09
0.84
0.00
1.00
1.22
1.17
0.98
1.22
1.34
1.12
0.90
0.00
0.65
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.62
EXHIBIT lc CONTRACTORS' REPORTED SKILLS
WORK TYPES
EXCAVATION TUNNELLING THIN CONC SHOP DWG MGT
CONTRACTOR PIPELINES MASS CONC SITE MNGMT MECH EQL SURVEY
AVERAGES
STAND. DE\v
2.66
2.08
2.72
3.00
2.13
3.12
2.75
2.70
3.00
1.89
3.34
3.00
2.67
0.45
1.94
1.75
2.18
3.50
1.50
3.42
3.00
2.11
2.33
1.63
3.17
3.00
2.41
0.719
1.60
1.00
2.00
2.80
1.00
2.75
3.00
2.00
2.50
1.00
2.81
3.00
2.04
0.803
2.75
2.71
2.60
2.36
2.60
2.95
3.63
3.27
3.00
1.93
3.26
3.00
2.47
2.61
2.23
2.38
2.60
2.73
3.63
3.17
3.00
1.94
3.05
3.00
2.71
2.73
2.46
2.50
2.67
2.48
3.00
3.00
3.50
1.47
3.17
3.00
2.86
2.69
2.80
2.56
2.63
2.52
3.00
2.89
3.25
1.94
2.94
3.00
2.82 2.71 2.70 2.73
0.452 0.46 0.502 0.331
SCALE: 4=MOST SKILLFUL
3=BETTER THAN AVERAGE
2=AVERAGE
1=BELOW AVERAGE
*= WRITER ESTIMATED
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# OF
3.00
2.85
1.86
2.68
2.33
2.21
3.00
2.75
3.50
2.00
2.67
3.00
2.62
0.476
19
14
18
18
10
25
4
12
4
19
19
1 *
14.73
EXHIBIT ld CONTRACTORS' PREDICTED SCORES
CONTRACTORS
PROJECTS
A B C D E F
9.78
8.32 9.67 9.91
7.10 7.37 7.59
7.15 6.82 7.16 6.45 7.32
6.28 7.18 7.32
3.25 3.28 3.85
7.36 6.97 6.72 7.54 7.74
6.42
7.87
7.16
6.79
G H
9.68
11.03 9.57
J K
10.76
6.01 10.82
8.41
7.61
9.259.44
6.80
8.77 8.05
5.75
5.71
6.75
5.50
5.47 5.28
5.85
5.24
6.42 7.54
7.64 9.86
7.72 6.55 7.88
6.14
5.91 5.18 6.16
8.81 9.05
6.86 6.99
5.00 5.17
6.20 6.35
5.60 5.74
4.67 4.85
5.22 4.78 5.42
8.06 7.38 7.97
7.40
11.03 9.63 10.56
6.31
6.38
4.78 8.09
4.14
5.12 8.62
7.32
5.47 9.24
4.98 8.40
7.76
7.02
10.81
5.12 8.70
3.99 6.90
6.81
5.96
7.53
5.54
6.90
6.17
5.28
I 1 I I I I I
L
7.20
8.98
7.59
7.13
10.59
I I I I i I I I f II
EXHIBIT le PER CENT MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECTS CONTRACTORS 2ND
A B C D E F G H I J K L
1 18.5 0 3.6
2 17.4 8.2 10.8 13.6 29.7 13.6 0
3 22.9 0 14.5 13.3
4 0 1.6 7.7 0.4 9.8
5 0 44.8 4.9 24.5 10.7
6 37.5 0 6.3 24.1
7 20 2.2 11.1 33 20 0 9.7
8 2.9 3.8 0 5.2
9 0 13.6 2.3 13.6 3.9 3
10 10 0.2 14.8 5.8 10.8 18.6
1 1 2.5 0 2.5 23.6 0.5 9.7
12 0 2.3 2.9
13 21 10 12.3 6.2 6.1 21 14.2 1.4 0
14 3.6 33 26 13.5 0 19.1
15 9.8 21.3 14.7 0 21.8
16 10.3 25.8 32.5 34.6 9.4 0 9.3 19.3
17 15.5 0 6.6
18 7.7 21.9 7.2 8.2 0
19 20.4 0 30.4
20 0 24.5 23.2
21 0 17.8 22.7
22 3.3 0 14.8
23 5.7 0 19.7 11.3
TOTALS 11 5 8 14 6 20
14.0 '=AVE MARG FR. LOW
2ND BID AVE MARGIN=
4 6 5 8 20
AVE # OF PROJECTS BID=
7.19
5
9.33
M
11.1
15.6
16.9
4.88
21.2
22.6
16
3.97
7.28
12
7.76
2.6
11.5
19
16.9
20.2
11.1
11.3
25.4
23.9
20.3
9.05
12.2
AVE # BIDDERS/PROJ=
#BID BID
3 3.6
7 8.2
4 13.3
5 0.4
5 4.9
4 6.3
7 2.2
4 2.9
6 2.3
6 0.2
6 0.5
3 2.3
9 1.4
6 3.6
5 9.8
8 9.3
3 6.6
5 7.2
3 20.4
3 23.2
3 27.8
3 3.3
4 5.7
112
4.87
SI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
EXHIBIT 2a: Predicted Outcomes vs. Margin From Low Bid Correlations
for Projects
PROJECT # 1
-10
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT #2
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
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I0-
".' --....,..
• • . .. ..
....· ~.
p = 0.253
10.8
10.6
10.4
10.2
10.0
~
)
6' f
EXHIBIT 2b
PROJECT # 3
R = -0. 1 05
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT #4
R = +0.675
7.4
7.2
7.0
6.8
6.6
6.4
0 2 4 6 8
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
EXHIBIT 2c
7-
4.2-
4.0 -
3.8-
3.6-
3.4-
23
PROJECT #5
R = -0.1 1
13 a
0
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 6
03
R = -0.032
I0 10
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
70
30 40
EXHIBIT 2d
PROJECT #7
n - -n =nC A
0 10 20 30
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
7.6
7.4 -
7.2 -
7.0 -
6.8 -
6.6 -
6.4-
PROJECT #8
R = 0.00
I I
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
7a
| I
EXHIBIT 2e
PROJECT #9
0 10
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT #10
R = +0.195
0
0P
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
72
a
PROJECT # 11
R = +0.307
0
u"
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 12
R = -0.886
EXHIBIT 2f
7.3
7.2
7.1
7.0
0 1 2 3
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
81I
A
7-
,
EXHIBIT 22
PROJECT # 13
R = -0.476
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 14
R = +0.550
0 10 20 30 40
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 15
R = +0.822
03
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 16
0
R = -0.243
0
m0
M
m o[E!o
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
| °I
PROJECT # 17
S= 0.00
0
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT # 18
R =- 0.225
01
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
EXHIBIT i
10 -
1
-3 -
91 I
EXHIBIT L2
PROJECT # 19
m=' -- In=% I A
0 10 20 30
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
7.0
6.8
6.6
6.4
6.2
PROIECT #?n
R = +0.630
0 10 20
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
EXHIBIT 2k
PROJECT #21
R = +0O824
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROIECT #22
R = +0.766
6.2
6.1
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.7
5.6
0 10 20
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
PROJECT #23
0 10
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
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EXHIBIT 21
EXHIBIT 3a: Relative Predicted Outcome vs. Margin From Low Bid
for Contractors
ALL CONTRACTORS
R = 0.1 90
00 W 0
mm
m0 _0 0
0
0
0 0m00-
[] []et
0 0
M a
mm00~
13 M
M
0 10 20 30 40
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: RELATIVE PRED. OUTCOME = CO. PPEDIC-•D OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
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EXHIBIT 3b
CONTRACTOR A
R= +0.063
0
40
MARGiN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR B
R = -0.439
3
0a
MARG>N FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Rel. Predicted Outcome = CO. PRED. OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
1.0 -
1.4 -
1.2-
1.0 4
1.4-
1.3-
1.2-
1.1-
1.0 -
0.9 -
0.8 -
n,' I I w
I L
v.,
CONTRACTOR C
R = - . 122
0 0a
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR D
R = +0.534 .
0
0I I I I
10 20 30
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Re!. Predicted Outcome = CO. DED. OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
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EXHIBIT 3c
CONTRACTOR E
R = + 0.648
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR F
U.
R = +0.377
13 0 M 101
0 M 0
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Rel. Predicted Outcome = CO. PPRED. CTCOrI'E
PRED. OUTCOME CF LOW BIDDER
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EXHIBIT 3e
CONTRACTOR G
R = - .E.93
MARGIN FRCOM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR H
R = -0.458
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Rel. Predicted Outcome = CO. PRED. OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
84
1.1 -
1.0.9 -
0.9-
EXHIBIT 3_
CONTRACTOR I
K = - 4
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR J
R = -0.690
0 10 20 30
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Rel. Predicted Outcome = CO. PRED. OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
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EXHIBIT 39.
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CONTRACTOR K
S= +0 6
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
rnNTRACTOR L
R = -0.407
0 2 4 6 5 10
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: Rel. Predicted Outcome = CO. PRED. OUTCOME
PRED. OUTCOME OF LOW BIDDER
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EXHIBIT 4a: Relative Predicted Outcomee-ve. Bid Margins
for Contractors
PREDICTED OUTCOMES VS. BID MARGINS
RELATIVE TO AVERAGE PREDICTED OUTCOMES
ON EACH PROJECT
ALL CONTRACTORS AND ALL PROJECTS
R = +0.063
UIIU
a]
I [m m
m
I
ii
dj
3 0
S0 20 30 40 50
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NOTE: REL. PREDICTED OUTCOME = CO. PREDICTED OUTCOME
AVE. PRED. OUTCOME OF ALL BIDDERS
ON THAT PROJECT
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.. Fa.: REL. PREDICTED OUTCOME = CO. PRED. OUTCOME
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EXHIBIT 4b
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EXHIBIT 4c
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EXHIBIT 4d
CONTRACTOR E
R = +0.134
0
0
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR F
R = -0.095
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REL. PREDICTED OUTCOME = CO. PrED. OUTCOME
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EXHIBIT 4e
CONTRACTOR G
1.20
1.18
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1.14
1.12
1.10
1.08
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3 10 20
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CONTRACTOR H
SR = + 0414
.
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NOTE: REL. PREDICTED OUTCOME = CO. PRED. 3UTCOME
AVE. PRED. OUT. OF ALL BIDDERS
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EXHIBIT 4f
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EXHIBIT 4A
CONTRACTOR K
R = 0O.268
0m
1P
[]
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
CONTRACTOR L
R = -0.686
0 2 4 6
MARGIN FROM LOW BID
NOTE: REL. PREDICTED OUTCOME = CO. PRED OUTCOME
AVE. PRED. OUT. OF ALL BIDDERS
93
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1.10
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1.04
1.02
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0.98
EXHIBIT 5
Margins From Low Bid on Contracts
Before and After a Firm's Winning Contract
Bids Before Win Bids After Win Winning Contract
Contrtr. No. Margin No. Margin As % of Ann. Revenues
A 1 2.5% 2 15.5% 16.0%
B 2 5.1%
E 3 17.7%
F 5 6.7%
G 3 6.9% 6.8%
H 1 2.5% 2 18.3% 23.6%
I 3 9.9% 2 13.2% 3.9%
J 2 12.2% 4.8%
K 3 7.8% 4 7.3% 5.2%
L 4 5.2% 1 9.2% 1.7%
XK 3 3.2% 2.2%
-- Joseph Gioioso
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Room 1-241 ( -3J o
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
This research project attempts to measure to what extent the relative skill levels of
General Contractors in various types of work is associated with the contractors' success in
bidding projects. The study will focus on GCs who perform public works projects in the
Boston area--specifically, contractors whose projects involve a wide variety of work types.
The two attached surveys attempt to quantify your perceptions of two different
aspects of the Boston Public Works Construction market: the relative skill levels of
different contractors in different phases of work, and the relative level of difficulty of the
various phases of work on several recent Boston-area projects. For both surveys, I define
optimum performance as:
1. minimizing rework and materials waste;
2. matching or exceeding the best possible schedule; and
3. maximizing manpower and equipment productivity.
Contractor Skills Survey
In the first survey, please rank how skillfully each contractor performs various work
types. For a given work type, please consider a contractor's skill relative to the skill of other
contractors (contractor A is better at excavation than contractor B) as well as the contractor's
skill relative to its skill in other work types (Contractor A is better at excavation than at
mechanical equipment installation). A contractor's skillfullness is the extent to which the
contractor can approach optimum performance as defined above.
What if the GC usually Subcontracts out a given Work Tvye? If you believe the
contractor typically subcontracts out a specific type of work, please rank the General
Contractor's skill in selecting and managing the subcontractors for that work type. Please
also mark that entry with an "S".
Scale: 4 = Superior, 3 = Better Than Average, 2 = Average, 1 = Below Average,
0 = Don't Know, and S + Rank = Typically Subcontracted.
Proiect Difficulty Survey
The second survey asks you to rank the level of difficulty of various work types
within public works projects which were recently bid and/or built within the Boston area.
Please rank the "difficulty" of the work types according to what fraction of contractors
within this sample would achieve optimum level ofperformance (as defined above).
*Most Difficult = most contractors would be unable to achieve optimum performance ;
*Not Difficult = nearly all contractors would achieve optimum performance.
Once again, your ranking of levels of difficulty should be relative to the other projects, as
well as relative to the difficulty of the other work phases within that project.
Scale: 4 = Most Difficult, 3 = Very Difficult, 2= Average Difficulty,
1 = Easier than Most, 0 = Don't Know, X = Not Part of Project.
Please Note: This project is meant to investigate industry practices, and will not in any
way comment on the Contractors' specific methods or successes. The final research paper
will keep all Contractors and questionnaire respondents anonymous-no firm or
individual will be refered to by name.
I thank you in advance for your assistance in my thesis work. I would be happy to
discuss my fimdings with you at the conclusion of the project.
Cntractor Skills Survey: Please rank the Contractors' skill in each of the Work
Types. Most Skillful = minimum rework/waste; fastest
schedule; and highest proauctivity.
Scale: 4-Most Skillful 3-Better than Average
2-Average I -Below Average -0=Don't Know
If Contractor usually Subcontracts The Work Type,
S + Rank - Skill at Choosing/Managing Subcontractor
:,Position:
'-,Firm:
Proiect Dif?!cuIty Survey: Please rank the Difficulty of each of the Work Types in
each of the Prolects
Most Difficult = Most Contractors will have nigh rework,
scnecule delays, ana/or low Droductivity.
5ca!e: 4 - Most Difficult 3 - Very Difficult \
2 - Average Difficulty 1 = Easier than Most
- * 4 VM- - kJ^* n'* ,f f ' *C-)
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